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Current Account Imbalances in the 
Monetary Union and the Great 
Recession: Causes and Policies 
 
Summary: Current account imbalances within the eurozone are at the roots of
its economic crisis. We argue that, though relevant, emphasis should shift from 
competitiveness to differential rates of growth of domestic demand as its chief
explanatory factor. Euro core countries have experienced a shortage of domes-
tic demand, with wage restraint playing a key role. This has led them to expe-
rience a current account surplus, which could not be understood independently
of a buoyant domestic demand in the peripheral countries, funded with private
debt. As a byproduct of that strong demand, the periphery suffered from wage
inflation and a loss of competitiveness. This dual growth pattern is unsustaina-
ble as indebtedness cannot go on without any limit. Neither wage cuts nor
fiscal austerity in the periphery will help to solve this mess: although trade
balance would be restored, it would lead to a negative shock in aggregate
demand, threatening their ability to settle debts at due dates.
Key words: Euro area, Current account imbalances, Wage policy, Great  
recession. 
JEL: E6, F4.
 
 
 
 
 
Most analysis of the causes of the economic crisis within the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) focus on current problems of public finances and the sovereign debt 
crisis, and the proposed solutions usually include as a critical component the tighten-
ing of the Stability and Growth Pact and the application of strict measures of fiscal 
austerity. 
In our view, however, the underlying reasons for the European crisis must be 
sought rather in the imbalances accumulated since the outset of the monetary union, 
particularly private and external debt, which in turn reflect the current account defi-
cits and surpluses that were taking place between different members of the euro zone. 
Therefore, the absence of institutional mechanisms to prevent and correct these im-
balances is more relevant to explain the crisis that the alleged violation of the fiscal 
rules. 
Although the euro area as a whole has remained relatively close to external 
balance with the rest of the world since 1999, with an average net lending of 0.3% of 
GDP, there have been significant and growing external imbalances within the EMU. 
On the one hand, Germany and other smaller countries such as Netherlands, 
Finland, Austria and Belgium have registered large current account surpluses during 
this period, and exports have played a key role in their growth strategy. On the other  
572  Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl and Eladio Febrero 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue,  pp. 571-592 
hand, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland have characterized precisely by the oppo-
site: large and growing current account deficits. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
these imbalances since 1999 for Germany and the four countries with larger deficits. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2011).
 
Figure 1  Current Account, % GDP 
 
Initially, the European authorities denied the importance of these imbalances, 
associating them to the process of convergence between countries and to optimizing 
decisions of individual agents, without macroeconomic consequences. Later on, and 
especially after the crisis, external imbalances have been attributed almost exclu-
sively to economic policy mistakes and "bad behavior" of the deficit countries: ex-
cessive fiscal spending, lack of competitiveness and export capacity, poor allocation 
of financial resources raised in international markets and excessive wage growth. By 
contrast, the surpluses are seen (for example, European Commission 2010a,  2010b) 
as a demonstration of economic efficiency and “virtue”: prudent fiscal policies, wage 
moderation and high productivity. Consequently, the proposals to address them, as 
the recent Euro Plus Pact, focus on the application of painful adjustment programs to 
restore competitiveness in these countries, mainly by means of wage restraint, fiscal 
austerity and structural reforms to improve their ability to compete (European Coun-
cil 2011). 
In this article we propose an alternative explanation for the causes of current 
account imbalances within the monetary union and their relationship with the origin 
of the economic crisis and, consequently, different economic policy proposals. The 
sources of current account deficit and surpluses are considered together and linked to 
the unbalanced growth model that has been developed within the EMU. Some coun-
tries with weak domestic demand follow an export-led growth strategy, whereas oth-
ers base their growth on the expansion of the domestic demand financed by debt. At 
the same time the single monetary policy, with the same nominal interest rate for all 
countries, reinforces the appearance of these two patterns. 
This model is characterized by a global shortage of demand, driven largely by 
the deterioration of income distribution, which is temporarily corrected by the accu-
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mulation of debt in some countries. However, the emergence of major imbalances, 
especially the accumulation of private debt, makes it very fragile and unsustainable 
in the medium term. 
According for example to Jean Paul Fitoussi and Joseph Stiglitz (2009) this is 
the true origin of the crisis and, therefore, the measures that have been undertaken in 
the last year in the European Union are in the wrong direction. The euro area needs 
different solutions to boost aggregate demand and to promote a balanced growth 
model, without imposing all the burden of the adjustment on the deficit countries. 
Gustav Horn, Heike Joebges, and Rudolf Zwiener (2009) and Engelbert Stockham-
mer (2010), among others, have also analyzed the development of two unsustainable 
growth patterns in Europe and its relation with the current crisis. 
 
1. An Alternative Explanation of Current Account Imbalances 
 
The central idea of this section is that current account imbalances that have been ob-
served within the EMU are not the result of internal imbalances and domestic eco-
nomic policy mistakes of countries with large deficits. The deficits of some countries 
and the surpluses of others stem from the same phenomenon: the existence of an un-
balanced growth model in which some countries with very low growth of wages and 
a weak domestic demand solve the negative effects on growth and employment fol-
lowing a export-led growth strategy, whereas others base their growth on the expan-
sion of the domestic demand financed by increasing debt. 
Both strategies are interdependent: the growth of the core is sustained by the 
demand from the periphery and, at the same time, these countries need that the sur-
plus countries fund their current account deficits. 
But this “solution” can only be provisional, because the accumulation of im-
balances (mainly, rising indebtedness and losses of competitiveness) makes it unsus-
tainable. 
The single monetary policy plays an important role in the development and 
maintenance of this unbalanced growth model, by applying the same nominal interest 
rate to countries with different behavior in their domestic demand and rates of infla-
tion. This results in a destabilizing effect and in turn gives rise to further increases in 
current account imbalances. 
In order to analyze how this model has developed and why is unsustainable, 
we will take the case of Germany and Spain as an example, given its importance in 
explaining the total amount of current account imbalances in the whole of the euro 
zone. Their external balances have registered an opposite behaviour, and in 2007 
amounted, respectively, to 71% of the sum of the surpluses of all lending countries of 
the EMU and 45% of the total deficit of all borrowing countries. In our opinion, the 
most relevant factors explaining the surplus in Germany and the deficit in Spain are 
the following: 
(1) The policy of wage restraint in Germany and its effects on domestic de-
mand and competitiveness. To determine whether the wage policy is too restrictive in 
a country, we use as a benchmark the sum of growth in productivity per employee 
and the inflation target, as in Eckhard Hein and Achim Truger (2009). This amount 
represents the scope available for nominal wage increases, without changing the rela- 
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tive share of income or exceeding the inflation target ("Scope for Wages"). Nor-
mally, for a Member State of EMU this target should be that established for the 
whole of the Euro zone (2%). Given that between 1999 and 2007 (from the start of 
EMU until the onset of the crisis) the average productivity per worker in Germany 
grew annually by 1.1%, the scope for wage growth was 3.1% per year. However, in 
this period the compensation per employee (in nominal terms) grew up in Germany 
at an annual rate of 1%. This means that in those years, wages in Germany grew by 
16% less than that allowed by increased productivity without compromising the in-
flation target (Figure 2a). And Figure 2b shows that the increase in nominal unit la-
bor cost in Germany during the last decade have been much lower than in previous 
periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 2a  Nominal Wages in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 2b   Nominal Unit Labor Cost Growth in Germany 
 
This had two important consequences. The first is that the share of wages in 
income brought down (Figure 3a), which had a negative impact on domestic demand 
growth (between 1999 and 2007, its average annual growth rate reached only 0.7% 
versus the 1.4% that had been achieved between 1995 and 1998, Figure 3b). 
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Horn et al. (2009, p. 25) present a complete analysis of the changes in income 
distribution in Germany during the last years and its consequences on aggregate de-
mand. They conclude that “the majority of the population has reacted to declining 
real wages and social spending cuts (especially in the state pension system) in recent 
years by reduced consumer spending. As statistical analyses show a large part of the 
increase of the household savings ratio is due to changes in the distribution of income 
and increased old-age provisions in connection with the recent pension reforms. Al-
most half of the increase of the savings ratio between 2001 and 2008 can be attrib-
uted to the shift in the income distribution from wage to profit incomes. The other 
half seems to be due to the effects of the pension reform.” 
Then, the low growth in wages was reflected in a reduced growth of private 
consumption, but the increase in the share of profits in income was not reflected in a 
more dynamic investment, which even declined, but in a higher net saving of non-
financial corporations and of the total economy (Figure 3c). In this context, the for-
eign sector is the main source of economic growth, well above the historical experi-
ence of Germany in the decades before (Figure 3d). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 3a   Labor Income Share 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 3b   Domestic Demand, Rate of Growth 
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Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 3c   Contributions to the Increase of GDP, Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011).
 
Figure 3d   Contribution of the Net Exports to the Increase of GDP, Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 4  Unit Labor Cost (Nominal, €) 
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The second consequence is that unit labor costs remained almost constant 
throughout this period, while in the rest of EMU grew 14%, and 30% in Spain (Fig-
ure 4). This improvement in the competitive position of Germany is clearly reflected 
in their exports of goods and services to the rest of the euro area, which worth was 
80% higher in 2007 than in 1999. In the same period, imports had grown only 51%, 
due also to the weakness of its domestic demand. In terms of GDP, the trade surplus 
with the rest of the EMU countries rose from 0.5% of GDP in 1999 to 3.8% in 2007. 
Despite these positive contributions to the growth of external demand, be-
tween 2000 and 2007 the German economy recorded a growth rate of 1.5% which is 
low compared with other Euro zone countries (2.1%), with its own previous experi-
ence (1.9% between 1994 and 1999), and with the growth rate required to prevent a 
rise in unemployment, which rose from 8.2% in 1999 to 11.2% in 2005. No doubt, 
therefore, that the growth of domestic demand in Germany was weak. 
(2) The increase of domestic demand and debt in Spain. If the German econ-
omy grew at an average annual rate of 1.5% between 2000 and 2007, Spain was 
growing at 3.6%. This high rate was mainly driven by domestic demand, specifically 
by private sector construction spending, and gave rise to a large increase in private 
debt and indebtedness with the rest of the world. Between 1997 and 2007, construc-
tion work started for more than 6 million dwellings were started to be built and one 
out of five new jobs was created by the construction industry. Private and public con-
sumption remained high, like productive investment. However, the latter meant a 
lower contribution to GDP growth because a great portion of this demand was cov-
ered with imports (48% in 1995, and nearly 60% in 2005) (Figures 5a and 5b). 
The strong growth in residential investment was driven by several factors, 
among which we should underline at least three: some demographic and social 
changes that increased the demand for housing, very low real interest rates and the 
reduction of the requirements for granting mortgage loans to families. For further 
discussion see Oscar Dejuán and Eladio Febrero (2010). 
Population increased nearly 7 million people, with immigration shifting from 
2.9% of total population in 1997 to 13.8% in 2009 (more than 5 million new immi-
grants). The rate of unemployment fell from almost 25% in mid 1994 to roughly 8% 
in 2007. Baby-boomers were in their 30s in the mid 1990s, the average age of first-
home buyers in Spain. Finally, it should be noted that the rate of ownership is very 
high in Spain and also it grew reaching 85% in 2007 (this percentage represents the 
rate of households living in a house of their own).  
However, as housing prices rose to a much higher rate than real wages (they 
remained almost constant in Spain during these years, and the labor share declined, 
as it is shown in Figure 3a) this potential increase in housing demand could material-
ize in a more effective spending only thanks to mass access of families to credit. This 
was made possible by the coincidence of a strong decrease in interest rates and the 
change in the financial institutions’ credit policy. 
Regarding interest rates, Figures 6a, 6b, 6c and 6d, show the reduction experi-
enced in both long term and short term rates in Spain, with the latter in negative fig-
ures between 2002 and 2006. This is due to the fall of nominal interest rate in Spain 
in the years before the start of EMU (more than 6 points between 1995 and 1999) due  
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to the convergence of all the official rates and the disappearance of risk premium 
associated for example to exchange rates variations, and the existence of higher infla-
tion than the average. In 2000 the rate of inflation in the Spanish economy was 3.4% 
versus 2.3% in the euro area and 1.5% in Germany. The average inflation rate since 
then has remained in Spain at 2.8% compared to 2% of the whole monetary union 
and 1.5% in Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 5а   Contributions to the Increase of GDP, Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banco de España (2010).
 
Figure 5b   Dwellings and GDP (% Growth), Spain 
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Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 6a   Nominal Long Term Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 6b   Nominal Short Term Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 6c   Real Long Term Interest Rate 
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Source: AMECO (2011).
 
Figure 6d   Real Short Term Interest Rate 
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housing and the effort of the debt - percentage of income that a representative house-
hold has to devote to debt service - rose by more than 12 points. 
All these factors led to a rapid growth in housing demand which was largely 
matched, though not fully, by the supply, so there was a rise in prices. In turn, this 
resulted in expectations of further price increases and the real estate bubble began. 
Therefore, the creation of EMU meant an expansionary shock to the Spanish 
economy, and the consequence of this surge in demand financed by debt and accom-
panied by a higher inflation rate than the average was obviously a rise in imports and 
the external deficit. 
(3) The difference in “neutral” interest rates in Germany and Spain and the 
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two economies with very different stances of their respective domestic demand coex-
ist in the monetary union: restrictive in Germany and expansive in Spain. In this 
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The European Central Bank aims to stabilize the inflation rate and uses as in-
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policy of moderate wage growth leads to lower growth in consumer demand in Ger-
many, and consequently the neutral interest rate is reduced in this country. But as the 
European Central Bank can only apply a monetary policy and its objective is price 
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is also a stabilizing mechanism through changes in real exchange rates (real apprecia-
tion tends to reduce net exports and aggregate demand in Spain and increase them in 
Germany) it seems to act more slowly. 
(4) The origin of imbalances lies in the private sector. It is important to note, 
for its strong implications for adequate economic policy proposals, that changes in 
net lending and borrowing recorded in Germany and Spain are explained mainly by 
the private sector behavior, and not by the public sector. Moreover, while in Spain 
these figures reflect the expansion of investment spending rather than the fall in the 
weight of savings to GDP, in Germany the increase in savings is largely responsible 
for changes in net lending, although there is also a significant drop in investment 
spending. 
 
Table 1 Gross Saving and Gross Capital Formation in Germany and Spain, % GDP 
 
Concept 
Germany Spain
2000 2004 2007 Change 
2007-2000 2000 2004 2007 Change 
2007-2000
Gross  
saving 
Total economy  20.2 22.0 26.0 5.8 22.3 22.4 21.1 -1.2
Households and NPISH 10.5 11.3 11.5 1.0 7.5 7.4 6.9 -0.6
Non-financial corporations 6.9 10.3 11.4 4.5 10.3 9.5 5.2 -5.1
Non-financial private sector 17.4 21.6 22.9 5.5 17.8 16.9 12.1 -5.7
Financial corporations 1.2 1.6 0.7 -0.5 1.5 1.5 2.1 0.6
General government 1.6 -1.3 2.4 0.8 3.0 4.0 6.9 3.9
Gross  
capital  
formation 
Total economy  21.8 17.1 18.3 -3.5 26.3 28.2 31.0 4.7
Households and NPISH 7.5 6.0 6.2 -1.3 7.4 9.1 9.7 2.3
Non-financial corporations 12.0 9.4 10.5 -1.5 15.3 15.2 17.2 1.9
Non-financial private sector 19.5 15.4 16.7 -2.8 22.7 24.3 26.9 4.2
Financial corporations 0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.3
General government 1.8 1.4 1.4 -0.4 3.2 3.4 4.0 0.8
Net  
lending/ 
borrowing 
Total economy  -1.3 4.8 7.7 9.0 -3.2 -4.8 -9.6 -6.4
Households and NPISH 3.7 6.0 5.6 1.9 1.4 -0.7 -2.4 -3.8
Non-financial corporations -6.6 1.5 1.3 7.9 -4.1 -4.5 -11.0 -6.9
Non-financial private sector -2.9 7.5 6.9 9.8 -2.7 -5.2 -13.4 -10.7
Financial corporations 0.4 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.9 1.4
General government 1.3 -3.8 0.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.4 1.9 2.9
 
Note: Net lending/borrowing do not equal the difference between gross saving and gross capital formation, because of 
capital transfers and net acquisitions of non-produced, non-financial assets. 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
 
Table 1 shows that the increase of net lending in Germany is mainly due to de-
leveraging of the non-financial private sector in the period 2000-2004. More specifi-
cally, 80% of this increase took place in non-financial corporations, because the 
gross saving increases considerably and capital spending suffers an important reduc-
tion. Households also contributed to increasing the net lending of private sector, but 
to a much lesser extent. In relation to the public sector behavior, we can distinguish 
two periods. Between 2000 and 2004 there was an increase in the public deficit 
which partially offset the weakness in private demand, but since then the budget con-
solidation also contributed to the increase in overall net saving. 
Regarding Spain, according also with Table 1 the increase in net borrowing 
(6.4 points of GDP between 2000 and 2007) is mostly explained by an increase in 
gross capital formation (4.7 points of GDP) and its origin lies also in the behavior of 
the private sector, mainly in non-financial corporations. Between 2000 and 2007, the 
financial balance of corporations deteriorated by 6.9 percent of GDP and households 
by 3.8 points, while the net lending of general government increased by 2.9 percent-
age points of GDP.  
582  Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl and Eladio Febrero 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue,  pp. 571-592 
(5) What is the relationship between the expansion of credit in Spain and the 
increase in net lending of Germany? The net borrowing in Spain has been covered to 
a significant extent with the increasing net lending of Germany. In 1998, the volume 
of foreign claims held by German banks did not reach the 400 billion dollars (about 
20% of German GDP). A decade later, before the onset of the international financial 
crisis, these assets were close to $ 5 trillion (180% of German GDP). In the same 
period, foreign assets of German banks against Spanish borrowers multiplied by 
more than 6 and it represented more than 6% of total foreign claims of German banks 
(Figure 7a). As a result of this process, the external exposure of Spain against Ger-
man banks reached 242,000 millions of US dollars in the third quarter of 2010, 
equivalent to approximately 17% of Spanish GDP, or 22% of cross-border debt of 
Spanish banks (Figure 7b). 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Immediate borrower basis. 
Source: BIS (2011).
 
Figure 7a   Foreign Claims of German Banks (Millions $) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 3Q-2010. Ultimate risk basis, except for German banks that are on an immediate borrower basis. 
Source: BIS (2011).
 
Figure 7b   Foreign Exposures of Spain against International Banking (Billions $) 
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The creation of the monetary union, the elimination of the risk premium and 
the increased financial integration made possible for these resources to be channeled 
more easily and at historically low cost to Spanish households and corporations, and 
this probably raised the threshold that can reach the current account deficit without 
problems for financing. 
However, this relationship between credit expansion in Spain and the financial 
resources available in Germany does not mean that the origin of the expansion of 
domestic demand is in the excess of German saving, as has been defended by, for 
example, Hans-Werner Sinn, Teresa Buchen, and Timo Wollmershäuser (2011). Un-
der this scenario, German saving would has been channeled to the Spanish banks, 
that have increased the credit to households and nonfinancial corporations. This 
would have boosted the investment spending, leading the expansion of demand and 
the housing bubble. At the same time, the outflow of this saving would be the cause 
that would explain the sluggish investment in Germany and the slow growth of its 
domestic demand. 
In fact, the divergent growth of demand in Germany and Spain has its own 
causes, which we noted above, and the behavior observed in financial flows is rather 
a consequence. The strength of demand in Spain explains the expansion of credit to 
the private sector, which is created endogenously by the banking sector. As part of 
the demand generated by these funds goes to deposits abroad through imports, the 
Spanish banks must raise funds by borrowing from those German banks where the 
deposits that have been created from its credit operations have materialized. Mostly, 
this is done by selling assets backed by mortgages to Spanish families. 
 
2. The Crisis in the Euro Zone as a Consequence of the 
Accumulation of Imbalances in “Peripheral” European Countries 
 
The growth pattern driven by domestic demand, which is characterized by high cur-
rent account deficits, leads to the accumulation of a series of imbalances that prevent 
its continuity. But on the other hand, if these countries cannot keep on borrowing, the 
export-led growth model also collapses, unless countries such as Germany can find 
other markets in which to place their exports. Therefore, the true cause of the Euro-
pean economic crisis lies in the development of a growth model doomed to failure. 
The international financial crisis is the factor that precipitated it and the subsequent 
worsening of public finances hinder the solution of the crisis, but they are not its ori-
gin.
1 
The first of these imbalances is the high level of debt, mainly from households 
and non-financial corporations, as Table 2 shows. For example, in Spain the total 
debt of non-financial private sector rose from 132% of GDP in 2001 to 214% in 
2007. This table also confirms that the Spanish debt problem appeared first in the 
private sector imbalances and not in the public sector. It also rose the accumulated 
debt held by residents of the rest of the world rose (in Spain, from 45% to 110% of 
GDP). Finally, the existence of a continued and growing deficit in the current ac-
                                                        
1 Eckhard Hein, Achim Truger, and Till van Treeck (2011) present a similar analysis of the causes of the 
crisis.  
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count of these countries has given rise to a progressive deterioration in its interna-
tional investment position (Figure 8). 
 
Table 2   Private and Public Debt in Deficit Countries (% GDP) 
 
Sector  Year Ireland Greece Spain Portugal 
Debt of housenholds and  
non-financial corporations (1) 
2001 150.9 63.0 132.4 187.4 
2004 170.5 77.3 159.9 198.9 
2007 211.4 106.5 213.7 229.9 
2009 317.2 123.0 225.1 259.6 
Public debt (2)  2001 35.5 102.9 55.5 52.9 
2004 29.4 98.6 46.2 58.3 
2007 25.0 105.0 36.1 62.7 
2009 65.5 126.8 53.2 76.1 
 
Notes: (1) Total loans and securities other than shares; (2) Definition of the excessive deficit procedure.  
 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011).
 
Figure 8  Net International Investment Position (% GDP) 
 
Another characteristic of the growth pattern of some peripheral countries 
(Spain and Ireland) is the overweight of the real estate sector. At the end of the pre-
vious expansive period, the weight of building industry in the generation of value 
added was much larger in Spain than the average for other countries in EMU, and its 
growth had been offset by a similar fall in the manufacturing sector (Table 3). This 
overweight of real estate sector and the bubble in housing prices also had a signifi-
cant impact on the financial sector, because the high percentage of bank assets re-
lated to real estate (either in the form of mortgage loans to households or to real es-
tate transactions). 
Finally, the differences in the growth rates of unit labor costs that have taken 
place in the euro area over a long period of time have had a cumulative impact on 
competitiveness, as reflected in Figure 9a. Relative unit labor costs between Spain 
and Germany in 2007 were 30% higher than in 1998, and if the comparison is with 
the euro area the loss of competitiveness was 14%. In Figure 9b we see, finally, that 
the growth of nominal wages in Spain has been higher than the scope coming from 
the increase of productivity and the inflation target (just the contrary than in Ger-
many). 
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Table 3 Supply Structure (% Gross Value Added, PPS) 
 
Economic sector 
Spain  Rest of Euro Area-12 
1997 2007  1997 2007 
Primary  sector  5.0% 2.7% 2.9% 2.1% 
Industry (exc. construction)  22.2%  17.3%  26.0%  24.7% 
     Manufactures  19.0%  15.0%  22.2%  21.7% 
Construction 7.1%  11.8%  6.3%  6.5% 
Services  65.7% 68.1% 78.7% 85.4% 
     Trade, restaurants and hotels, transport  26.4%  24.5%  23.1%  23.8% 
     Financial Intermediation  18.3%  22.5%  29.8%  34.7% 
     Public and social services  21.0%  21.0%  25.8%  26.9% 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011). 
 
 
 
Source: Ameco (2011).
 
Figure 9a   Relative ULC in Spain versus Germany and the Euro Zone (1998=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ameco (2011).
 
Figure 9b   Nominal Wages in Spain 
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A possible interpretation of these data is that workers are too expensive, given 
their productivity. However, growth in nominal unit labor costs in Spain has been 
accompanied by a declining labor share of wages in income (an increase of profit 
margins). In other words, the increase in nominal wages is not the result of a change 
in the distribution of income in favor of wages, but of a higher inflation rate and the 
attempts to compensate -without full success- its effects on the real wage (relative to 
productivity). As noted by Jesús Felipe and Utsav Kumar (2011), to reduce the prob-
lems of the external sector to a measure of competitiveness centered on unit labor 
costs puts the burden of adjustment on workers, and ignores that the unit capital costs 
(ratio of the nominal profit rate to capital productivity) has also grown in the periph-
eral countries, and faster than labor costs. 
To see the relationship between the accumulation of imbalances, the origins of 
the crisis and the difficulties to overcome it, we can use the example of Spain again 
(Dejuán and Febrero 2011) explain these arguments more deeply). 
The growth of the previous period had been closely linked to residential in-
vestment, but in 2007 it had exhausted for several reasons. First, the household debt 
had reached very high levels and housing prices had tripled in ten years. Although 
initially the debt has an expansionary effect, insofar as it is intended to finance higher 
spending, the burden of debt service has detrimental effects in the long-term. Thus, at 
the same time that residential investment falls, the debt service resulting from previ-
ous years rises, provoking an increase in "forced savings". And this contraction in 
spending has been even greater because agents want to reduce the percentage of total 
debt to disposable income. Besides this, the ECB had begun to raise interest rates in 
late 2005 fearing a rebound in the inflation rate caused by the increase of raw mate-
rial prices. Finally, the housing market was already saturated: nearly 7 million dwell-
ings had been built in the last decade and, in 2007, 700,000 units more were started, 
when it was estimated that the number of unsold dwellings was 500,000. 
The economic recovery cannot be grounded again on the construction industry 
and in fact it is unlikely that the housing market will recover in the short term. In 
2009, the stock of unsold dwellings amounts to 688.044 units, 2.7% of the total stock 
of existing dwellings. And the previous expansion coincided with several social and 
demographic factors that are not maintained today. 
Once the construction has halted its momentum, no other productive sector 
has taken over as the locomotive of the economy, resulting in a raise in unemploy-
ment that has worsened the problem of households’ indebtedness. 
An expansionary fiscal policy was carried out in 2008 and 2009 to offset the 
fall in private demand. However, the increase in public deficit and debt and sover-
eign debt crisis led the Spanish government to implement fiscal austerity measures, 
which causes an additional restrictive effect. And although the external sector has 
moved to make a positive contribution to growth, the cumulative loss of competi-
tiveness highlighted above also limits its expansive effect. 
Finally, the access to international financial markets to finance domestic 
spending also cut off. This shows that external debt has a limit, regardless of whether 
it originates in the public sector or the private sector. Membership of monetary union 
facilitated the financing of current account deficit before the current crisis began, but  
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also exacerbates the difficulties that these countries now face, which makes interna-
tional investors wary of lending to Spanish borrowers. As pointed out by Paul De 
Grauwe (2011), a massive sale of securities of the peripheral countries would lead to 
a depreciation of its currency if this existed, favoring the correction of current ac-
count deficit. However, the nominal depreciation cannot take place within the euro 
zone, so the situation is equivalent to having issued debt in a foreign currency. 
 
3. Economic Policy Proposals 
 
Since the outset of the Greek crisis (May 2010) the European authorities (national 
governments, European Commission and ECB) are applying an economic policy 
strategy whose main elements are the following (see European Commission 2011a):  
(i) The establishment of fiscal consolidation as the top priority of economic 
policy, considering it a necessary prerequisite to normalize financial markets and 
ensuring the stability of the euro area. The deficit reduction measures are concen-
trated in health care costs, pensions, salaries of civil servants and other social bene-
fits as well as increases in indirect taxation. See Sotiria Theodoropoulou and Andrew 
Watt (2011) for an analysis of the austerity plans passed in the UE; 
(ii) A proposal for the reform of European governance with three essential 
elements: the adoption of the European Semester, the strengthening of the budgetary 
discipline rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and its translation into national leg-
islation and the adoption of a new mechanism to monitor macroeconomic imbal-
ances, explicitly including current account imbalances. For a critical assessment of 
these proposals, see Jorge Uxó and Jesús Paúl (2011); 
(iii) The adoption in the deficit countries of measures to correct the imbal-
ances in competitiveness as reflected in the evolution of unit labor costs (Euro Plus 
Pact); 
(iv) Implementation of structural reforms in both labor and product markets in 
order to reduce unemployment and raise the long-term growth. In the Commission's 
view, these reforms are necessary due to the negative impact that the crisis has had 
on the potential growth of European economies (for example, European Commission 
2011b); 
(v) Providing financial support to those economies more vulnerable to sover-
eign debt crises, which include the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the 
European Financial Stability Facility and, from 2013, the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM); 
(vi) Reform of financial supervision and regulation, which would include 
stress tests and the need for recapitalization of banks more vulnerable, the introduc-
tion of new regulations (hedge funds, rating agencies) or the reform of the regulators 
(European Systemic Risk Supervisory Board and the European Authorities). 
We believe that these economic policies not only do not solve the fundamental 
problems related to the functioning of the monetary union, and specifically current 
account imbalances, but they worsen them. 
Firstly, the general approach of these proposals is clearly focused on the sup-
ply side, when the main constraint facing the European economies is the shortage of 
demand. To solve the growing unemployment, the only measure proposed is the la- 
588  Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl and Eladio Febrero 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 5, Special Issue,  pp. 571-592 
bor market reform, when the origin of this problem is essentially macroeconomic. 
Surprise, especially, some measures that pursue an impact on labor supply ("make 
work pay"), when what is recorded in this market is in any case, a situation of excess 
of supply. Or, to drive growth, they insist on the same structural reforms included in 
the failed Lisbon Strategy that have, in any case, a long-term effect. The European 
Commission argues that the crisis has had a negative effect on potential growth, but 
does not take into account that these effects are produced precisely because of the 
prolonged shortage of demand and growth (long-term unemployment, discouraged 
workers leaving the labor force and low investment and therefore less productive 
capacity). It cannot be argued that demand will eventually adapt passively to the ag-
gregate supply conditions on which it is intended to act, when the source of the im-
balances that have led to the current crisis lies precisely in the weak demand growth 
in core countries. 
Secondly, European governments have ended up placing the crisis of sover-
eign debt and public deficit problems in the center of all its proposals, ahead of the 
recovery in demand at a rate sufficient to reduce unemployment. They consider it a 
"prerequisite" to accelerate growth. However, the fiscal crisis is the result of the eco-
nomic crisis, not its origin. A typical case is that of Spain, where both the deficit and 
public debt was reduced throughout the prosperity years, amply fulfilling the criteria 
of the Stability Pact. Current imbalances are not due to failure of the fiscal rules, and 
it does not make sense to further harden them. It is also obvious that fiscal austerity 
policies (implemented simultaneously in all European countries) will have a restric-
tive effect on demand, aggravating the recession. 
Thirdly and directly related to the specific issue of current account imbal-
ances, the policies that are currently being implemented to correct them only focus 
on the adjustment of the competitiveness of the deficit countries, mainly through 
policies of wage restraint. But the interpretation of the imbalances that have been 
proposed in this paper shows that the solution to this problem cannot be reached only 
with deflationary policies in the “peripheral” countries. 
A closer look at the Spanish economy will illustrate these conclusions. The 
economic crisis has led to a sharp increase in unemployment; to reduce it within a 
reasonable period of time would require a high economic growth in the coming 
years, probably more than the European average. While to achieve this it would be 
necessary to stimulate the aggregate demand, the Spanish economy seems trapped in 
two vicious circles that prevent it to reach this aim in isolation:  
(a) The high level of indebtedness of households and corporations limits the 
possibilities of a strong pull in private consumption and investment, which is also 
weakened by the current low level of utilization of productive capacity, the deteriora-
tion of business expectations and financial system problems. But in the current insti-
tutional framework of the euro zone the ability to use expansionary fiscal policy is 
clearly limited by the problems in debt markets. In this sense, Phillip Arestis and 
Malcom Sawyer (2011) criticize some characteristics of this institutional framework 
that restrict the operation of economic policies and propose some alternatives. 
(b) If the growth rate returns to be above the average for other euro zone coun-
tries to eliminate unemployment, the balance of payments constraint will surely re- 
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appear in the form of external current account deficit, but under present conditions it 
would be difficult to finance it. Therefore, Spain needs to adjust its competitiveness, 
which also would allow an expansion of its exports, and the way it intends to do this 
is through internal devaluation achieved with lower wage growth. But this strategy is 
very risky for several reasons. The first is that it has restrictive effects on demand, 
not only due to the negative impact on the propensity to consume, but by the in-
creased burden of servicing debt (a nominal contract) on disposable income and the 
probable loss of tax revenues, which would force further cuts in public spending. The 
second is that, to be successful, the strategy of wage restraint should lead to lower 
inflation than the average of other countries in the EMU: what matters is the relative 
position. However, if all countries intend to engage in competitive reductions of 
wages (even surplus countries such as Germany could defend its current position of 
advantage), it is not sure that this "race to the bottom" could be an improvement in 
competitiveness. Moreover, if policies to reduce wages provoke a generalized reduc-
tion in growth rates, it would actually aggravate the structural problem of shortage of 
demand which the European economy has been facing. 
The most important implication that emerges from our analysis, therefore, is 
that the economic recovery and the resolution of current imbalances cannot come 
only from the side of the deficit countries, trying to regain competitiveness through 
wage restraint, but also from the side of the surplus countries. If these countries 
maintain a policy of low wages and slow growth in domestic demand, it will be im-
possible to solve this imbalance for deficit countries, except at the expense of a deep 
recession and deflation, which would actually end up endangering the repayment of 
past debts. 
On the contrary, it seems necessary to address the root causes that have re-
sulted in the lack of demand in the whole system, and to implement a more balanced 
pattern of growth within EMU, in which the countries do not base their growth on 
stimulating exports by means of wage competence. This alternative economic policy 
should include measures like these:
2 
(1)  To eliminate the pressure that the risk of a debt crisis implies for the fiscal 
policy choices of national governments, the ECB should be clearly committed to 
purchasing as much public debt as necessary. This would avoid speculation against 
any country; 
(2)  It should be set a European fiscal authority, with the ability to issue debt 
on behalf of European countries, at least up to a particular level. This would also re-
quire real cooperation on fiscal policy making sure that, the full effect on aggregate 
demand would be the appropriate one; 
(3)  Falling taxes -and not increasing spending- has led to fiscal deficits in 
most European countries. These policies are regressive and put the Welfare State at 
risk. So, national fiscal authorities should harmonize taxes instead of practising “fis-
cal competence”; 
(4)  A widespread policy of wage restraint and cuts in public spending is not 
the right way to improve competitiveness, particularly if this goal is reached at the 
                                                        
2 See Febrero and Uxó (2011) for a more detailed analysis of the economic policy alternatives in Spain. 
Horn et al. (2010) and Stockhammer (2011) also offer some specific economic policy proposals.  
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expense of higher unemployment. A better way of realign competitiveness between 
EMU countries would be: (i) to increase the inflation target set by the ECB for the 
monetary union; (ii) to set a lower than average inflation target in the deficit coun-
tries for some time; (iii) to implement a coordinated wage policy, targeting wage in-
creases in accordance with productivity gains plus the national inflation target. Once 
losses accumulated in competitiveness were eliminated, this wage policy would be 
neutral for competitiveness inside the Euro Zone, thus avoiding the recurrence of 
current problems. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
A way of analyzing the current account imbalances in the euro area, which is basi-
cally shared by the European authorities, is to interpret them as the result of problems 
of competitiveness, lack of efficiency and economic policy mistakes made by the 
deficit countries. The central idea of this article, however, is that the genesis of these 
imbalances is in the growth pattern that has characterized the European economies 
since the creation of the euro. We have used the cases of Spain and Germany to sup-
port this assertion. 
For several reasons, but mainly as a result of changes in the distribution of in-
come and wage restraint policy, there has been a structural shortage of demand in 
core countries (e.g. Germany). But these countries have partially offset the negative 
consequences of this fact on their growth rates thanks to the strong growth in the 
domestic demand of the “peripheral” countries. In turn, this growth in demand was 
driven to a significant extent by lower interest rates experienced by these countries to 
join the monetary union and the ECB setting of a single rate for the entire Euro zone.  
However, this solution to the problem of the shortage of demand could only be 
provisional, because it was financed by increasing borrowing. Current account im-
balances are the manifestation of this phenomenon, but also the accumulation of in-
creasing amounts of debt (mostly private), the accumulated losses of competitive-
ness, the real estate sector hypertrophy and the excessive risk taken by financial insti-
tutions. 
The creation of the monetary union and the resulting financial integration 
played also a key role in explaining the rising current account deficit to levels his-
torically unknown: the risk premium disappeared and easier access to funding was 
ensured. 
The Great Recession occurs when this demand growth financed with debt be-
comes unsustainable (not only in the “peripheral” European countries but also in 
other countries like the U.S.) and there is no other agent taking over demand genera-
tion. Initially it was expected that the public sector would generate such demand, but 
the debt crisis forced European governments to implement fiscal austerity plans. In 
any case, the structural problem of lack of demand goes beyond just a cyclical short-
age that could be corrected only with transitory fiscal policies. To solve it, it is nec-
essary for domestic demand to grow faster in countries that have developed in the 
past a growth model based almost exclusively on exports. And to make this possible, 
it is necessary to change the pattern of income distribution and the wage restraint 
policy applied in countries like Germany, which is usually seen as an example of 
moderation and virtue in the official European documents.  
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